Kuptsova Irina Valentinovna

The article is devoted to the consideration of anti-corruption technologies in the state civil and municipal service based on the analysis of the best practices presented in the nomination “Anti-Corruption Technologies” at the annual competition held by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Russian Federation in 2015–2019. Participation in the competition of state bodies and local self-government bodies shows not only their interest, but also an active search for new personnel technologies, which should increase the effectiveness of anti-corruption policy. Currently, the majority of anti-corruption technologies in the state and municipal service are based on information and communication platforms. This allows not only to optimize the processes, but also to increase the transparency and openness of the activities of state bodies and local self-government bodies.

The main research problem of this article is the possibility of applying
some concepts of the neo-institutional approach to analyzing the history
of public administration system in Russia in the 19th — early 20th centuries,
as well as in the late Soviet era. Th is allows us to better understand the general
patterns of evolution of the mechanisms of state institutions functioning
in the past and present. Th e research method was case analysis; the selected
cases relate to manifestations of information asymmetry and opportunism of
subjects of state governance interactions. Th e paper examines the reaction of
government offi cials to the Decree of Alexander I of August 6, 1809 “On the
rules of promotion to ranks in the civil service and on tests in the sciences,
for promotion to Collegiate Assessors and State Councilors.” As the second
example illustrating the manifestation of “government opportunism”, the period
of the “Great Reforms” in Russia was chosen. Th e third case considered
was the development by the supreme power of normative documents ensuring
the activities of representative government bodies created in accordance with
the provisions of the Manifesto of October 17, 1905. Th e latest of the analyzed
cases were manifestations of information asymmetry and opportunism during
the perestroika period, examined using the examples of cotton pricing and the
behavior of regional government offi cials in relation to production cooperatives.
In all analyzed cases, the possession of more information by one of the parties led to an increase in mistrust between the participants in the interaction, usually
supporters of reforms and their opponents. In turn, mistrust resulted in opportunistic
behavior of subjects in the process of developing and implementing
reform plans. Ultimately, all this led to falling into institutional traps and the
consolidation of negative institutional qualities.