Volgin Evgeniy Igorevich

The article considers the last congress of the CPSU as an important event in the history of this organization. This congress was held in the context of the intensification of the crisis of the USSR. Under these circumstances, the CPSU’s refusal from the constitutional status of the ruling party was due not so much to the opposition’s pressure, but to the rational aspiration of the party elite to absolve itself of responsibility for the crisis. This congress, despite its «democratic» entourage (the presence of representatives of various party factions, radical changes in the highest party bodies, the adoption of a «social-democratic» program, etc.), is assessed as a meeting of the communist elite concerned for its political future. Despite the harsh criticism of Gorbachev leaders, the XXVIII Congress was marked by a compromise of the elite of the CPSU. But if in a tactical way this congress ended successfully for the party elite, then in the strategic perspective this forum predetermined the rapid historical defeat of the CPSU.

The article discusses the process of adoption by the Federal Assembly of a law on the election of deputies of the Second State Duma. This law, which became an integral part of the Russian electoral legislation of the 1990s, suddenly became the subject of political disagreement. The conflict was initiated by Duma deputies elected from political associations who wanted to reserve all the electoral opportunities that had been granted by the President in 1993. Defending electoral legislation in its original form, party leaders used various procedural tricks to pass the law they needed. However, such tactics, as well as fundamental differences between the State Duma and the Federation Council, whose deputies saw the electoral legislation differently, only aggravated the conflict. However, such tactics, as well as fundamental differences between deputies of the State Duma and the Council of the Federation, who had different ideas about electoral legislation, only aggravated the conflict. The president, who initially initiated the adjustment of electoral legislation, although he did not agree with the deputies of the Duma, was an arbitrator in this conflict, but was not an active participant. As a result, the conflicting parties managed to reach a compromise and coordinate their interests. The author positively assesses the consensus reached with the help of parliamentary mechanisms, but he believes that the results of this political deal have been devalued in the context of the general crisis in the country.

The article is devoted to the problem of adopting the law “On Political Parties” in the second half of the 1990s. Based on a study of various sources, the author attempts to finalize this law after it was rejected by the Federation Council in early 1996. The adoption of this law was dictated by the need to exclude numerous non-political organizations from the electoral process. The total participation of these organizations in the 1995 parliamentary elections led to conflicting results and cast doubt on the effectiveness of the majorityproportional electoral system. Howevear, despite the intentions of the deputies, who, it would seem, were interested in the speedy adoption of this normative act, work on the document had stalled. The reasons that did not allow the adoption of this document again were in several factors. This is, firstly, an extremely difficult political situation in which the Duma of the second convocation acted, constantly standing on the verge of dissolution. Secondly, a significant amount of legislative work was influenced, which the opposition Duma was forced to carry out under constant time pressure. Thirdly, deputies feared that this law would be used against opposition parties. However, the decisive factor, which for decades did not allow achieving results, was the absence in Russia of strong parties and a developed party system. On the other hand, the refusal to fix the special rights and obligations of political parties in a special law can be considered as a feature of the Russian constitutional law of the 1990s. The then legislation allowed not only ideological, but also organizational pluralism for numerous socio-political associations.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the state electoral policy of the 1990s, it is shown that the results of the study of the political experience of the 1999 parliamentary elections in Russia can be used for a deeper understanding of modern electoral technologies. The purpose of this article is, based on the complex use of various sources (laws, press materials, electronic resources), to consider the election campaign in the Third Duma because of a contradictory, but at the same time, integral state electoral policy aimed at realizing the electoral rights of citizens and their associations. This research is based on the diachronic, systemic, comparative, and formal legal method. The author identifies the following subjects of electoral policy in the Russian Federation in the late 1990s: The President, the Federal Assembly represented by the State Duma, the highest courts, and the Central Election Commission. At the same time, the field of Russian electoral politics was a diversified and competitive environment, where none of the actors had an absolute advantage. Only close interaction of all branches of government, each of which tried to contribute to the improvement of the electoral model, contributed to the implementation of the Russian electoral policy to ensure the electoral rights of citizens.